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Two experiments are presented which explore online counterfactual processing in autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD) using eye-tracking. ParticipantsÕ eye movements were tracked 
while they read factual and counterfactual sentences in an anomaly detection task. In 
Experiment 1, the sentences depicted everyday counterfactual situations (e.g. If Joanne had 
remembered her umbrella, her hair would have been dry/wet when she arrived home). 
Sentences in Experiment 2 depicted counterfactual versions of real world events (e.g. If the 
Titanic had not hit an iceberg, it would have survived/sunk along with all the passengers). 
Results from both experiments suggest that counterfactual understanding is undiminished in 
adults with ASD. In fact, participants with ASD were faster than TD participants to detect 
anomalies within realistic, discourse-based counterfactuals (Experiment 1). Detection was 
comparable for TD and ASD groups when understanding could be grounded in knowledge 
about reality (Experiment 2), though the two groups employed subtly different strategies for 
responding to and recovering from counterfactual inconsistent words. These data argue 
against general difficulties in global coherence and complex integration in ASD. 
 











Our tendency to undo events in the past and imagine Ôwhat might have beenÕ is an example of 
engaging in counterfactual reasoning (e.g. Òif only I had woken up on time, I would have 
made it to my job interviewÓ), which can help to avoid making similar mistakes in the future 
(e.g. avoiding oversleeping by setting an extra alarm). Understanding counterfactual 
statements arguably requires the comprehender to hold two mental representations Ð one of 
the implied Ôreal worldÕ (where I did not wake up on time and missed my job interview) and 
one of the counterfactual, imagined world (where I did wake up on time and made it to my 
job interview; Mental Model Theory, Byrne & Tasso, 1999; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). 
Indeed, on this view, to represent the counterfactual consequent (that I did make it to my job 
interview), it is necessary to inhibit the representation of the real world (that I did not wake 
up on time and missed my job interview; see Byrne, 2016).  
Although the cognitive basis of counterfactual processing has only recently been 
investigated empirically, evidence has been largely supportive of the Mental Model Theory 
(for reviews, see Ferguson, in press, Kulakova & Nieuwland, 2016b). For example, Ferguson 
and Sanford (2008; see also Ferguson, Sanford, & Leuthold, 2008 Experiment 1) tested 
counterfactual processing using an eye-tracked anomaly detection reading task. Previous 
research has established that when readers encounter a word that is anomalous with the 
sentence context, they make longer fixations on that word and more regressions back, 
compared to when the word is congruent with the sentence context (e.g. Braze, Shankweiler, 
Ni, & Palumbo, 2002; Ni, Fodor, Crain, & Shankweiler, 1998; Rayner, Warren, Juhasz, & 
Liversedge, 2004). This shows that readers are sensitive to discourse-level inconsistencies in 
text. Ferguson and Sanford (2008) presented participants with factual and counterfactual 
scenarios across two sentences. The first sentence established the context as either factual 
(e.g. ÒIf cats are hungryÉÓ) or counterfactual (e.g. ÒIf cats were vegetariansÉÓ), and the 
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second sentence presented a hypothetical event that was either consistent or inconsistent with 
the context, dependent on a critical word (e.g. feeding a cat a bowl of fish vs. carrots). Thus, 
scenarios were fully crossed to describe either real world inconsistent, real world consistent, 
counterfactual world inconsistent, or counterfactual world consistent, events. Results showed 
that readers rapidly accommodated the novel counterfactual world, spending longer reading 
critical words that were inconsistent with the described counterfactual world and taking 
longer to go past this region (as they tried to make sense of the anomaly) than when critical 
words were consistent with the counterfactual world. Nonetheless, counterfactual world 
inconsistencies were detected slower than factual world inconsistencies, because readers had 
to inhibit real-world knowledge before they could detect counterfactual inconsistencies (as 
Mental Model Theory would predict). Interestingly, in an event-related brain potentials 
(ERPs) study, Nieuwland and Martin (2012) observed comparable anomaly detection brain 
responses within factual and counterfactual contexts, suggesting that factual knowledge does 
not always disrupt counterfactual processing.  
Experiments subsequent to Ferguson and Sanford (2008) have employed diverse 
methods, such as reaction times, eye-tracking, and ERPs. These studies have found subtle 
differences in the time course that neurotypical adults process different types of 
counterfactual sentences, from those sentences that describe everyday events (de Vega, 
Urrutia, & Riffo, 2007; de Vega & Urrutia, 2012; Ferguson, 2012; Ferguson & Cane, 2015) 
to those sentences that describe surreal events (Ferguson & Sanford, 2008; Ferguson et al., 
2008; Nieuwland, 2013). It is possible that these differences are due to the different types of 
counterfactual being tested. For example, processing counterfactuals may be less cognitively 
effortful when they describe plausible alternatives to reality (e.g., counterfactuals about 
everyday events) compared to counterfactuals that depict novel scenarios (e.g., 
counterfactuals about non-realistic events). Indeed, in production studies people are more 
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likely to produce Ôclose to factÕ counterfactuals, and do not tend to create reality violating 
alternatives (e.g. Lewis, 1973; McMullen & Markman, 2002; Seeleu, Seeleu, Wells, & 
Windschitl, 1995). Furthermore, the methods used in previous research differ in terms of how 
language comprehension progresses; eye-tracking allows text to be presented at once, thus 
reading is more natural. However, ERPs are typically recorded via word-by-word 
presentation, meaning that readers cannot revisit earlier parts of the text to resolve 
difficulties. The current study fills a gap in the literature on counterfactual processing by 
presenting two experiments that examined different types of counterfactual structures, but 
using a common (eye-tracking) methodology, which allows accurate comparison of effects 
across experiments. 
The current study also fills a gap in the study of developmental disorders, because it 
investigates counterfactual processing among adults with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), in 
comparison to age- and IQ-matched neurotypical adults. ASD is a developmental disorder 
diagnosed on the basis of behavioural difficulties with social-communication, and a restricted 
and repetitive repertoire of behaviours and interests (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). At the cognitive level, people with ASD manifest impairments in executive 
functioning (Adams & Jarrold, 2012; Williams & Jarrold, 2013) and the ability to imagine 
novel scenarios (Lind & Williams, 2012; Lind, Williams, Bowler, & Peel, 2014). It would be 
important to know whether counterfactual processing is also impaired in this disorder, 
because counterfactual thoughts are pervasive in adult mental life and play an integral role in 
higher-level cognition. A recent ERP study on a neurotypical sample has shown that 
individual differences in social skills play an important part in establishing counterfactual 
worlds and linking them with real world knowledge online (Kulakova & Nieuwland, 2016a). 
Yet very little work has explored this directly, using rigorous methods in a clinical sample. 
What little research that exists has focused on children or adolescents with ASD, and 
		 6	
examined biases in counterfactual thinking, with mixed results. For example, Scott, Baron-
Cohen and Leslie (1999) found that, relative to Typically Developing (TD) children, children 
with ASD were unimpaired in their ability to respond to syllogistic reasoning questions based 
on counterfactual reasoning (e.g. ÒAll cats bark. Rex is a cat. Does Rex bark?Ó). However, 
the ASD groupÕs performance became significantly impaired when they were instructed to 
create a picture of the story in their mind; in contrast, this instruction enhanced performance 
among the TD children. This may suggest that counterfactual processing is impaired in ASD 
only when demands on imagination are high. More recently, Morsanyi and Handley (2012) 
found impairments in counterfactual reasoning within a fantasy context among adolescents 
with ASD. Specifically, Morsanyi and Handley found that TD adolescents benefitted from 
the presentation of contrary-to-fact statements in a fantasy context, whereas adolescents with 
autism did not. These difficulties in ASD could be the result of an underlying difficulty 
disengaging from real world knowledge, among other reasons (discussed below). However, 
drawing firm conclusions from the existing research on counterfactual processing in ASD is 
not possible, because the literature is limited in several respects.  
First, all previous studies have focused on a narrow age-group of 
children/adolescents. However, ASD is a lifelong developmental disorder and therefore it is 
not clear whether the observed differences and difficulties in processing counterfactual 
sentences in childhood persist into adulthood, or whether the development of counterfactual 
processing ability is merely delayed in ASD. Second, the majority of previous research in this 
area has focused on the production of counterfactual statements (Begeer, Terwogt, 
Lunenburg, & Stegge, 2009), or has required explicit responses to an investigatorÕs questions 
(e.g. Leevers & Harris, 2000; Peterson & Bowler, 2000). This is problematic because it 
combines ambiguous task demands and social interaction with an unfamiliar experimenter, 
which may lead to deficits among participants with ASD on experimental tasks not because 
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of difficulties processing counterfactuals per se, but because of extraneous task demands on 
social interaction and inference. Alternatively, it may be that people with ASD (adults and/or 
children) have difficulties with generating counterfactuals, but not with comprehending them. 
Finally, all previous studies of counterfactual processing in ASD have employed ÔofflineÕ, 
response-based, methods that do not assess the real-time processing of counterfactual 
information, and are therefore not sensitive to subtle preferences or delays in 
factual/counterfactual processing.  
To address these gaps in the literature, the two experiments reported here employed 
online eye-tracking methods to explore the comprehension of counterfactual statements in 
adults with ASD during natural reading. Eye movements during reading provide an excellent 
online tool to test real-time processing of counterfactuals, because eye movement data can be 
examined using a variety of spatially and temporally sensitive measures, allowing 
identification of exactly where in the sentence difficulties emerge. Crucially, eye-tracking 
measures have been integral to psycholinguistic research for over 30 years (see Rayner, 1998; 
2009), meaning that a great deal is known about different eye movement patterns and the 
aspects of language processing that they represent.  
 In Experiment 1, participants with and without ASD were presented with hypothetical 
(but realistic) counterfactual scenarios (as used in Ferguson, 2012) in an anomaly detection 
task. Participants read sentences that described everyday counterfactual events (e.g. ÒIf 
Joanne had remembered her umbrella, her hair would have been dry/wet when she arrived at 
workÓ), where the critical word (underlined in the example) was consistent or inconsistent 
with the counterfactual context. Crucially, these counterfactuals involved a minimal change 
from reality (i.e. they did not violate real-world knowledge), and comprehension could be 
supported by participantsÕ everyday experiences, which places relatively low demands on 
inhibitory control and imagination. Passages depicting factual versions of events (using 
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ÒBecauseÓ) were also included as a baseline measure of contextual integration. Our central 
predictions in Experiment 1 were as follows. Because the materials map directly onto 
peopleÕs real-life experiences and do not alter existing knowledge of the real-world, we did 
not expect to observe between-group differences (i.e., a significant effect of Group) in the 
detection of contextually anomalous critical words within the counterfactual sentences. 
Rather, we predicted that both TD and ASD participants would detect inconsistent words in 
factual and counterfactual scenarios to an equivalent extent. However, we predicted that both 
groups would experience more reading disruption for inconsistent words within factual 
scenarios than counterfactual scenarios (replicating Ferguson, 2012; Ferguson & Cane, 
2015), since the implied factual version of events within a counterfactual context would be 
activated alongside the counterfactual event. In other words, we expected to observe a 
context x consistency interaction, reflecting a larger difference in reading times for consistent 





Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the University of Kent Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee. Twenty five adults with ASD (18 males) and 25 age-, sex-, and 
IQ-matched TD adults took part (see Table 1), all of whom gave written, informed consent 
before participating. IQ was assessed in all participants using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale 
of Intelligence (WASI, Wechsler, 1999). Participants in the ASD group had all received 
formal diagnoses of autistic disorder (n = 6), AspergerÕs Syndrome (n = 18), or Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder Not-Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS; n = 1), according to DSM-V 
or ICD-10 criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; World Health Organization, 
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1993), and diagnostic reports were verified by the researcher. Current ASD features were 
assessed in 22 of the 25 participants in the ASD group by a trained, research-reliable assessor 
using the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-Generic (ADOS, Lord et al., 2000).  
All participants completed the Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ, Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001), a 50-item self-report questionnaire that 
assesses ASD/ASD-like features. Mean scores for the AQ in each group are shown in Table 
1. All participants were over the age of 18 and none had diagnoses of dyslexia or intellectual 
disability. All participants reported English as their native language. Participants in the TD 
group did not report any current psychiatric diagnoses.  
   
Insert Table 1 here. 
  
Materials 
Anomaly Detection Reading Task 
Sentences were modified from Ferguson (2012), as in (1) below. Thirty two experimental 
items were created, each with four conditions (counterfactual consistent, counterfactual 
inconsistent, factual consistent, factual inconsistent). Each item consisted of a single 
sentence, where the antecedent in the first clause introduced a factual (ÒBecauseÉÓ) or a 
realistic counterfactual (ÒIfÉÓ) scenario, and the consequent in the second clause described 
an event, where the critical word was either consistent or inconsistent with the preceding 
context. All scenarios described physical state events (e.g. wet/dry hair) to eliminate any 
possible confound associated with group differences in mental state processing.  
 
(1)!a. If Joanne had remembered her umbrella, her hair would have been dry when she 
arrived at work. (counterfactual consistent) 
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b. If Joanne had remembered her umbrella, her hair would have been wet when she 
arrived at work. (counterfactual inconsistent) 
c. Because Joanne had remembered her umbrella, her hair was dry when she arrived at 
work. (factual consistent) 
d. Because Joanne had remembered her umbrella, her hair was wet when she arrived at 
work. (factual inconsistent) 
 
Critical words were matched across conditions for length, written frequency (using 
the MRC Psycholinguistics Database; Wilson, 1988), and semantic relatedness with the 
preceding context (using Latent Semantic Analysis; Landauer & Dumais, 1997)
1
. 
Experimental items were also pre-tested for cloze probability and critical word plausibility. 
Cloze probability was tested by a total of 48 students from the University of Kent using an 
online questionnaire platform (Qualtrics). Items were presented one at a time, truncated 
before the critical word, and participants were instructed to complete the sentence with the 
first sensible word coming to mind. Cloze probability was computed as the percentage of 
trials that elicited the intended consistent or inconsistent critical words, and the ANOVA was 
conducted allowing generalization to items. Participants were significantly less likely to 
complete sentences with inconsistent (M = 1%) critical words than sentences with consistent 
critical words (M = 56%; F(1, 31) = 164.1, p < .001, 
2
p
h  = .84), and context (counterfactual 
vs. factual) did not modulate this difference (F = 1.42).  
																																								 																				
1
 There was a non-significant trend for longer words in inconsistent compared to consistent conditions 
(6.34 vs. 5.63), F(1, 124) = 2.90, p = .091, 
2
p
h  = .02, and marginally lower log Kucera and Frances 
written frequency scores in inconsistent compared to consistent conditions (1.48 vs. 1.74), F(1, 122) = 
3.52, p = .063, 
2
p
h  = .03. Therefore, word length and word frequency were included as random factors 
in the eye-tracking analyses on the critical word to control for any such differences across conditions. 
No differences were found in semantic relatedness, F = .5, p = .5. 
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Critical word plausibility was assessed by a different set of 84 students from the 
University of Kent using Qualtrics. Items were presented in full, and participants were asked 
to rate the plausibility of each sentence using a five-point sliding scale from -2 (highly 
implausible) to +2 (highly plausible). The ANOVA was conducted by items. Sentences 
containing inconsistent critical words were rated as significantly less plausible (M = -1.46) 
than sentences containing consistent words (M = 1.46; F(1, 31) = 2046.9, p < .001, 
2
p
h  = .99), 
and this effect was larger within a factual (-1.50 vs. 1.56) than counterfactual (-1.42 vs. 1.36) 
context (F(1, 31) = 10.8, p < .005, 
2
p
h  = .26). 
Four presentation lists were created, with each list containing thirty-two experimental 
items, eight in each of the four conditions. Sentences from Experiments 1 and 2 (a total of 64 
sentences) were randomly interleaved with each other and an additional 64 filler items. These 
filler items were all single sentences and did not contain any anomalies, or conditional 
structures. Half described everyday events (e.g. ÒHubert was fanatical about soap operas and 
never missed an episodeÓ) and half described general knowledge facts (e.g. ÒNew York is a 
big city, it has lots of taxis and restaurants"). This created a random order such that each 
participant only saw each experimental sentence once, in one of the four conditions. 
Participants were randomly assigned to read each list. All sentences were presented over two 
lines of text, with one blank line in between. The critical word was never the first or last word 
in a line, and appeared in the same position across all conditions. Comprehension questions 
followed half of the experimental (i.e., 16 each for Experiments 1 and 2) and filler (i.e. 32) 
trials.  
 
Inhibitory Control Task 
The Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) was used as a measure of individualsÕ inhibitory control. It 
consisted of 50 incongruent trials, 50 congruent trials, and 50 non-colour word neutral trials. 
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Responses were recorded using a five-button serial response box. Interference scores were 
calculated by subtracting response times (RTs) on the neutral trials from incongruent trials. 
RTs under 200ms or greater than 2.5 standard deviations from each participantsÕ mean RT 
were removed as outliers. Results showed marginally impaired inhibitory control in the ASD 
versus TD group (91 vs. 61msec; see Table 1). 
 
Imagination Task 
The scene construction task described by Hassabis, Kumaran and Maguire (2007), and used 
by Lind et al. (2014) among individuals with ASD, was used as a measure of imagination. 
Participants were asked to imagine three vivid scenes in their mindÕs eye and describe them 
out loud. Participants completed a questionnaire after each description to report their 
experiences in the task, including difficulty, vividness of the scene, etc. The recordings of the 
descriptions were transcribed and blind coded by the first author for the number of people 
and objects mentioned; sensory descriptions; spatial descriptions; and thoughts, emotions and 
actions described. The third author also coded 10% of the transcriptions to check reliability of 
coding and inter-rater reliability was found to be good with intraclass correlation of .89 
(F(14, 14) = 11.42, p < .001). Scores from the descriptions and questionnaires were then 
combined as described in Hassabis et al. to provide an index of imagination (an Òexperiential 
index scoreÓ), with higher scores indicating greater imagination ability. Results showed 
significantly impaired imagination in the ASD versus TD group (34.7 vs. 40.8; see Table 1). 
 
Procedure 
For the anomaly detection reading task, participantsÕ gaze location and movement from their 
dominant eye was recorded using an EyeLink 1000 Plus eye-tracker (viewing was binocular). 
All sentences were presented in size 20 Arial font style on a VDU screen, 60cm from the 
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participantsÕ eyes. Prior to the experiment, the procedure was explained and participants were 
instructed to read at their normal rate. Participants were seated at the eye-tracker and a chin 
rest was used to stabilize participantsÕ head position. The eye-tracker was calibrated using a 
nine point procedure. Before each sentence, participants performed a drift correction using a 
central fixation point. Once this calibration check was completed accurately, the 
experimenter advanced the screen to display the next item. Adjustments to the calibration 
were made whenever necessary. After reading each sentence, participants clicked a button on 
the mouse that either led to the presentation of a comprehension question (after 50% of trials) 
or the next trial.  
The entire testing procedure took approximately two hours to complete, and 
participants always completed the eye-tracking task first. The AQ, WASI, Imagination, and 
Stroop tasks were subsequently completed in a randomised order. Participants with ASD 
returned on a separate occasion to take part in the ADOS. Testing took place in a quiet 
research lab at the University of Kent. 
 
Results 
Methods of Analysis The experimental passages were divided into three regions for analysis. 
The consistent or inconsistent critical word was always presented mid-sentence: 
 
 Pre-critical  Critical  Post-critical  
ÒIf Joanne had remembered her umbrella, her hair would have been wet/ dry when she arrived at work.Ó 
 
An automatic procedure pooled fixations shorter than 80ms with larger adjacent 
fixations, excluded fixations shorter than 40ms that were not within three characters of 
another fixation and truncated fixations longer than 1200ms. A baseline comparison of global 
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eye movement data across all trials revealed that TD and ASD groups did not differ in 
average fixation duration (208ms vs. 213ms, p=.53), number of fixations per sentence (19.0 
vs. 19.9, p=.51), or saccade amplitude (3.02¡ vs. 3.0¡, p=.83), thus we can be confident that 
there were no sampling differences between the two groups. 
Two early measures of language processing are reported. First-pass reading time is 
the sum of the duration of fixations made on first entering a region of text until an eye-
movement exits the region to either the left or right. Regression path is the sum duration of all 
fixations from first entering a region on the left, to exiting the region on the right (this 
includes any initial regressions back to previous regions). These early measures provide an 
indication of the difficulty experienced when participants initially process a region of text. 
We also analysed one later measure. Total reading time is the sum duration of all fixations 
made within a region and provides an indication of the overall amount of time spent 
processing text in that region. Mean reading times were computed for each measure in each 
of the three regions for all four conditions in each group (see Table 2). For transparency, the 
full datasets for both experiments are available on the Open Science Framework web pages 
(see https://osf.io/kw8sx/?view_only=2e57d7ecf7134eababf2c19ffddf20eb). 
 
Insert Table 2 here. 
 
The eye movement data was log-transformed and analysed separately for each region 
and measure using the lmer function in the lme4 package (Bates, Mchler, Bolker, & Walker, 
2015) using R (version 3.3.2, R Core Team, 2016). Each model included fixed effects of 
Group, Context, and Consistency, with the two levels of each fixed effect deviation coded (-
.5 vs. .5) to ensure they could be directly compared. In addition, given group differences in 
imagination and inhibitory control (marginal) these values were centred and entered into the 
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model as continuous fixed effects to ensure that any effects of group were a result of ASD. 
Models included the maximal random effects structure, including random effects for 
participants and items, crossed random slopes for Group, Context and Consistency and 
random slopes for imagination and inhibitory control within items, and crossed random 
slopes for Context and Consistency within participants (as suggested by Barr, Levy, 
Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). In addition, analyses on the critical word included continuous 
predictors of word length and word frequency. Random effects were only removed where 
they lead to non-convergence due to overparameterization. Statistical effects from these 
models are shown in Table 3.  
 
Insert Table 3 here. 
Insert figure 1 here. 
 
First-Pass Reading Time 
As expected, given the difference in length between counterfactual and factual contexts (e.g. 
Òher hair would have beenÓ vs. Òher hair wasÓ), a significant main effect of context was found 
in the pre-critical region, with longer first-pass reading times for counterfactual compared to 
factual sentences. In addition, first-pass reading times on the critical word were modulated by 
individual differences in Imagination, showing that participants with higher imagination 
scores had longer first-pass reading times in these regions. 
The Consistency x Group interaction was significant on the critical word region. 
Follow-up analyses revealed that, for TD participants, there was no significant difference in 
first-pass reading times whether the critical word was consistent or inconsistent with the 
sentence context, Est. = .016, SE = .012, t = 1.28, p = .2. However, the ASD group showed 
marginally longer first-pass reading times when the critical word was inconsistent with the 
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sentence context relative to when it was consistent, Est. = -.025, SE = .014, t = -1.86, p = 
.063. 
 Finally, there was a significant Context x Consistency interaction in the post-critical 
region. Follow-up analyses showed that within a factual context first-pass reading times were 
marginally longer following an inconsistent critical word than a consistent critical word, Est. 
= -.032, SE = .018, t = -1.8, p = .08. However, within a counterfactual context first-pass 
reading times did not differ between consistent and inconsistent conditions, Est. = .027, SE = 
.02, t = 1.32, p = .19. Following an inconsistent critical word, first-pass reading times were 
marginally longer in a factual than counterfactual context, Est. = -.041, SE = .021, t = 1.97, p 
= .058, but did not differ following a consistent critical word, Est. = -.021, SE = .017, t = -
1.24, p = .22.  
 
Regression Path Reading Time 
Similar to the first-pass reading time measure, a significant effect of Context in the pre-
critical region showed that participants took longer to move past this region for 
counterfactual sentences compared to factual, due to length differences between context 
conditions. Individual differences in Imagination had a significant effect on regression path 
reading times in the pre-critical and critical regions, reflecting the same positive correlation 
between imagination scores and reading time as seen in the first-pass reading time measure. 
Group had a significant effect on reading times in the critical region, due to 
significantly longer regression path times in the ASD versus TD group. Moreover, Group 
interacted significantly with Consistency in this critical region. Similar to the pattern seen in 
first-pass reading times, no difference was found in regression path times for TD participants 
whether the critical word was consistent or inconsistent with the sentence context, Est. = 
.009, SE = .022, t = .41, p = .68. However, the ASD group showed significantly longer 
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regression path times on the critical word when it was inconsistent compared to consistent 
with the context, Est. = -.064, SE = .025, t = -2.57, p < .05. 
 Finally, a significant effect of Consistency in the post-critical region revealed longer 
regression path times for inconsistent versus consistent words. A simultaneous interaction 
between Context and Consistency revealed that this effect of consistency held within both 
contexts, though was larger following a factual, Est. = -.184, SE = .025, t = -7.22, p < .001, 
than counterfactual context, Est. = -.115, SE = .033, t = -3.53, p < .001. However, participants 
had longer regression path reading times on the post-critical region following a consistent 
critical word within a counterfactual context than a factual context, Est. = -.072, SE = .029, t 
= -2.45, p < .05. Regression path reading times did not differ between factual and 
counterfactual contexts following an inconsistent critical word, Est. = -.001, SE = .03, t = .04, 
p = .97.  
 
Total Reading Time 
Statistical analyses revealed a significant effect of Consistency in the total time spent reading 
each region, indicating that participants spent longer reading the sentences when the critical 
word was inconsistent compared to when it was consistent with the wider context.  
As in other measures, the effect of Context was significant in the pre-critical region, 
showing that participants spent longer reading this region when sentences were 
counterfactual compared to factual, due to length differences between context conditions. 
Total reading times on the critical word were also marginally longer in the ASD group than 
the TD group. 
Interestingly, as in first-pass and regression path reading times, the interaction 
between Context and Consistency was significant on this measure in the post-critical region. 
Follow-up analyses showed that the overall effect of consistency (inconsistent > consistent) 
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was only significant within a factual context, Est. = -.103, SE = .02, t = -5.13, p < .001, and 
not within a counterfactual context, Est. = -.021, SE = .022, t = -.98, p = .34. Participants did 
not differ in total time reading this region following a consistent critical word within a 
counterfactual or factual context, Est. = -.025, SE = .019, t = -1.33, p = .19, but spent more 
time reading when this post-critical region followed an inconsistent word within a factual 
than a counterfactual context, Est. = .06, SE = .02, t = 2.99, p < .01.  
 
Summary 
Several important findings were revealed in Experiment 1. First, the consistency effect 
(inconsistent > consistent) on total reading times in all regions showed that overall, 
participants accommodated the hypothetical counterfactual world; they detected 
counterfactual inconsistencies in a comparable timecourse to factual inconsistencies. Second, 
factual inconsistencies elicited greater disruption to reading compared to counterfactual 
inconsistencies, as reflected by a larger consistency effect on the post-critical region in first-
pass reading times, regression path reading times, and total reading times. Crucially, these 
patterns were manifest in both groups. Thus, when counterfactuals involve a minimal change 
from reality, counterfactual language processing is comparable in TD adults and adults with 
ASD. Nevertheless, some differences in processing emerged between the two groups. First, 
the ASD participants showed longer overall reading times on the critical word compared to 
the TD participants. More importantly, participants with ASD were quicker than TD 
participants at spotting anomalies across both types of contexts; they had longer first-pass and 
regression path reading times on inconsistent critical words than consistent critical words, a 
difference not found among the TD participants. We will return to this point in the General 
Discussion. 
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In sum, Experiment 1 provided evidence that high-functioning adults with ASD are 
able to process counterfactual sentences. However, these were simple counterfactual 
sentences where the implied factual world was based purely on a temporary discourse, 
resulting in a minimal change to reality. It may be that people with ASD have more difficulty 
with counterfactual reasoning when a more substantial change to reality is required. To test 
this in Experiment 2, participants read sentences that described hypothetical alternatives to 
known historical events (e.g. ÒIf the Titanic had not hit an iceberg, it would have 
survived/sunk along with all the passengersÓ; adapted from Nieuwland & Martin, 2012), 
where the critical word was consistent or inconsistent with the counterfactual context (but 
inconsistent/consistent with factual knowledge). Crucially, these counterfactuals required 
readers to suspend their knowledge of reality and imagine a novel version of the world. Thus, 
our central prediction in Experiment 2 was that participants with ASD would experience 
greater interference from their historical knowledge, and that this would disrupt or delay 
anomaly detection effects for an inconsistent critical word within a counterfactual context. 
This would be demonstrated by a reduced or delayed inconsistency effect within a 




Experiment 2 was run concurrently with Experiment 1. Therefore methodology was as 




Sentences described known historical events, and were translated and modified from 
Nieuwland and Martin (2012). Thirty two experimental items were created in the same four 
conditions as Experiment 1, as in (2) below.  
 
(2) a. If the Titanic had not hit an iceberg, it would have survived along with all the 
passengers. (counterfactual consistent) 
b. If the Titanic had not hit an iceberg, it would have sunk along with all the passengers 
(counterfactual inconsistent) 
c. Because the Titanic had hit an iceberg, it had sunk along with all the passengers 
(factual consistent) 
d. Because the Titanic had hit an iceberg, it had survived along with all the passengers 
(factual inconsistent) 
 
As in Experiment 1, critical words were matched across conditions for length, 
frequency, and semantic relatedness with the preceding context, and no significant 
differences were found (all Fs < 1.8, ps > .18)
2
. Cloze probability of experimental items was 
rated by 44 undergraduate students at the University of Kent, and sentence plausibility was 
rated by 42 different undergraduate students at the University of Kent. ANOVAs were 
conducted allowing generalization to items. As expected, cloze probability of consistent 
critical words (M = 55%) was significantly higher than inconsistent critical words (M = 
1.2%, F(1, 31) = 234.4, p < .001, 
2
p
h  = .88), and context did not modulate this difference (F = 
0.19). Plausibility ratings were significantly higher for sentences where the critical word was 
																																								 																				
2
 Although there were no significant differences in word length or frequency across conditions, these variables 
were included as random factors in the analysis of the critical word region for consistency with Experiment 1. 
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consistent (M = 1.46) than inconsistent (M = -1.63; F(1, 31) = 1177.9, p < .001, 
2
p
h  = .97), 
and this effect was larger within a factual (1.58 vs. -1.84) than counterfactual context (1.35 
vs. -1.43), F(1, 31) = 18.9, p < .001, 
2
p
h  = .38.  
 
General Knowledge Assessment 
ParticipantsÕ general knowledge for the historical events described in Experiment 2 was 
assessed using a questionnaire. One question for each experimental item (e.g. ÒWhat 
happened in New York on September 11
th
 2001Ó?) was presented on a computer, and 
participants were instructed to type in a short answer, or write ÒI donÕt knowÓ. Participants 
were highly accurate, averaging 95% of questions answered correctly (SD = 6.5%), and there 
was no significant difference in accuracy between the ASD (M = 93%, SD = 5.59) and TD 
groups (M = 94%, SD = 7.48), t(48) = -0.49, p = .629, d = 0.15. 
 
Results 
Methods of Analysis As in Experiment 1, stimuli were divided into three regions for 
analysis, with the consistent/inconsistent word always appearing mid-sentence: 
 
 Pre-critical Critical Post-critical 
ÒIf the Titanic had not hit an iceberg, it would have survived/ sunk along with all the passengers.Ó 
 
 
Eye movement data was prepared and analysed as in Experiment 1. The resulting 
reading items for each measure, region and condition are shown in Table 4, and statistical 
effects are shown in Table 5.  
 
Insert Table 4 here. 
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Insert Table 5 here. 
 
First-pass Reading Time 
A significant effect of Context was found on first-pass reading time in all three regions, 
reflecting longer first-pass reading times for counterfactual compared to factual sentences. In 
the pre-critical region this is likely due to differences in length between counterfactual and 
factual contexts, whereas for the critical and post-critical regions this is likely to reflect 
additional early processing on the critical word within a counterfactual context.  
A significant Context ! Consistency ! Group interaction was found on the critical 
word region. Within a factual context, neither group showed a significant difference between 
consistent and inconsistent critical words (TD: Est. = -.015, SE = .017, t = -.88, p = .38; ASD: 
Est. = -.032, SE = .025, t = -1.27, p = .21). More importantly, within a counterfactual context 
TD participants showed a significant consistency effect on the critical word (inconsistent > 
consistent), Est. = -.046, SE = .017, t = -2.67, p < .05, whereas participants with ASD did not, 
Est. = .008, SE = .025, t = .32, p = .75. In addition, first-pass reading times on the critical 
word were modulated by individual differences in Imagination, reflecting longer first-pass 
reading times in participants with higher imagination scores. 
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
Regression Path Reading Time 
Similar to first-pass reading times, there was a significant effect of Context on regression 
path reading times in the pre-critical and post-critical regions. This showed that participants 
took longer to move past these regions for counterfactual compared to factual sentences, and 
is likely to reflect length differences in the pre-critical region. The context effect in the post-
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critical region, however, may additionally indicate slower integration of the counterfactual 
premise. 
 More importantly, a significant effect of Consistency was found on the critical word 
region and the post-critical region. Participants took longer to move past these regions when 
the word was inconsistent with the preceding context compared to when it was consistent. In 
addition, regression path reading times on the critical word showed a positive correlation with 
participantsÕ imagination scores. 
  
Total Reading Time 
A significant effect of Consistency was found in all three regions, with participants spending 
longer reading each region when the critical word was inconsistent compared to when it was 
consistent. In addition, a significant effect of Context was found in the pre-critical and critical 
regions, showing that participants spent longer overall reading the antecedent clause and 
critical word when it described a counterfactual version of the world as opposed to factual 
information.	
 There was a significant Consistency x Group interaction in the pre-critical region. TD 
participants spent significantly longer reading this region when the sentence contained an 
inconsistent critical word compared to a consistent critical word, Est. = -.084, SE = .018, t = -
4.7, p < .001, but this difference missed significance in participants with ASD, Est. = -.031, 
SE = .018, t = -1.74, p = .09.  
Total reading times on the critical word were significantly longer in the ASD group 
than the TD group, and people with higher imagination scores had longer total reading times 




In Experiment 2, readers successfully used the counterfactual context to process incoming 
events according to an alternative version of the world (evidenced by the consistency effect 
on total reading times in all regions). Interestingly, anomaly detection effects were 
comparable between factual and counterfactual contexts, suggesting that readers did not 
experience interference from the Ôreal worldÕ when processing the counterfactual sentences. 
Indeed, detection of the inconsistency emerged early in Experiment 2, with effects appearing 
on the critical word itself (in longer regression path reading times), suggesting that 
participants rapidly noticed the contextual inconsistency and responded by re-reading prior 
text. Similar to Experiment 1, ASD participants showed longer total reading times on the 
critical word compared to the TD participants. Most importantly, adults with ASD were able 
to process non-real counterfactual events in an equivalent timeframe to TD participants, 
although some subtle between-group differences emerged in the way that counterfactual 
inconsistent words were responded to and recovered from (we discuss these subtle 
differences in the General Discussion).  
 
General Discussion 
In two eye-tracking reading experiments, we sought to understand how individuals with ASD 
interpret counterfactual events online. In Experiment 1, items described counterfactual 
situations that modified the outcome of everyday events (e.g. If Joanne had remembered her 
umbrella, her hair would have been dry/wet). In Experiment 2, items set up hypothetical 
alternatives to known historical events (e.g. If the Titanic had not hit an iceberg it would have 
survived/sunk). While the counterfactual events in both experiments were logically true, 
sentences in Experiment 1 incurred a minimal change from reality (i.e. greater overlap 
between hypothetical and counterfactual worlds), but understanding in Experiment 2 required 
readers to suspend their knowledge of reality and imagine a novel version of the world. 
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Before discussing how the results inform our understanding of counterfactual 
processing in ASD, it is important to consider how the results relate to previous studies of 
counterfactual processing in neurotypical individuals. Overall, the patterns of performance 
shown by TD participants in each experiment replicate those from previous research in TD 
adults. In Experiment 1, where judgements about the consistency of critical words were based 
on constraints from the local discourse, TD readers elicited anomaly detection responses from 
the post-critical region, with increased regression path reading times on this region, and 
longer total reading times across the entire sentence. In addition, readers experienced some 
interference from the alternative model of the world, showing a reduced (or absent) 
consistency effect in a counterfactual, relative to factual, context on the post-critical region 
(across all three reading measures). In contrast, in Experiment 2, where counterfactual/factual 
worlds were more clearly distinct and understanding could be grounded in knowledge about 
reality, anomalies disrupted reading from the critical word itself, with longer regression path 
reading times on this region, and increased total reading times across the entire sentence. 
Here, readers did not show signs of conflict with the alternative world; the consistency effect 
was comparable within factual and counterfactual contexts.  
Therefore, in the TD group, anomaly detection effects appeared one region earlier in 
the sentence in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, and context (factual/counterfactual) did 
not influence anomaly detection in Experiment 2 as it did in Experiment 1. Anomaly 
detection on the critical word itself in Experiment 2 is likely due to the stimuli, which tapped 
real world knowledge and could be easily retrieved and updated from long-term memory. In 
contrast, stimuli in Experiment 1 manipulated discourse based anomalies, so required readers 
to generate new temporary representations of both factual and counterfactual worlds, which 
competed with each other in memory, and delayed anomaly detection responses to the post-
critical region. Moreover, the timing with which counterfactual inconsistencies were detected 
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between the two experiments replicates the timing effects seen in previous research 
(Ferguson, 2012; Ferguson & Cane, 2015; Nieuwland & Martin, 2012). This shows that the 
different counterfactual constructions being tested (and the specific constraints they incur), 
rather than methodological differences between previous studies (i.e. eye-tracking versus 
ERPs), can account for differences in the timecourse of counterfactual understanding [see 
Ferguson & Cane (2015) for further discussion of paradigm sensitivity].  
Regarding the key issue of counterfactual understanding in ASD, results from both 
experiments showed that adults with ASD do not experience gross difficulties understanding 
counterfactual sentences online; effects of consistency were clear in both groups. This 
extends findings from a recent eye-tracking reading study showing comparable lexical access 
in ASD and TD individuals (Howard, Liversedge, & Benson, 2017). Intriguingly, however, 
between-group differences emerged in the timecourse with which the counterfactuals were 
processed. In Experiment 1 participants with ASD detected factual and counterfactual 
inconsistencies even earlier than the TD group, with anomaly detection responses emerging 
in early reading measures on the critical word itself (on first-pass and regression path reading 
times). In Experiment 2, both TD and ASD readers showed anomaly detection responses 
upon encountering the critical word (on regression path time), though subtle differences 
emerged in the way the two groups responded to and recovered from these inconsistencies. 
Specifically, the TD group first spent longer first-pass reading inconsistent versus consistent 
critical words in a counterfactual context before regressing back to check the preceding 
context (reflected in increased regression path times on the critical word and increased total 
reading times on the pre-critical region). In contrast, participants with ASD did not show an 
inconsistency effect on first-pass reading times, but they rapidly regressed back to re-read the 
critical word (reflected in increased total reading times on the critical word) and earlier parts 
of the sentence. The fact that the TD group, but not the ASD group, showed an anomaly 
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effect on the ÔearlyÕ first-pass pass reading time measure may indicate a subtle timing 
advantage for anomaly detection in the TD group in Experiment 2, though both groups were 
clearly sensitive to the inconsistency upon first encountering the critical word. Nevertheless, 
both groups exhibited the same context modulations of anomaly detection (i.e. weaker effects 
of consistency for counterfactual than factual contexts in Experiment 1 but not Experiment 
2), suggesting that TD and ASD participants experienced similar interference from reality. 
The fact that in both experiments counterfactual inconsistencies were detected by 
participants with ASD in a comparable, or even enhanced, timecourse as TD participants is a 
novel finding, and contrasts with previous research that has shown impaired counterfactual 
reasoning in children with ASD (e.g. Grant, Riggs, & Boucher, 2004). One potential 
explanation for this discrepancy is the developmental nature of the disorder; difficulties in 
childhood often abate in adulthood, with many symptoms of ASD improving throughout the 
lifespan (Shattuck et al., 2007). Thus, it is possible that individuals with ASD simply 
experience a protracted period of developing fully functional counterfactual thinking, which 
extends beyond that of TD individuals (see Beck & Riggs, 2013; 2014). Alternatively, the 
explicit, response-based methodologies employed in previous studies may have driven 
response biases and errors (see Rubio-Fernndez (2013) for a similar argument for Theory of 
Mind processing). For example, people with ASD are more susceptible to demand 
characteristics and so the syllogistic reasoning questions used in several previous studies (e.g. 
Scott, Baron-Cohen, & Leslie, 1999; Leevers & Harris, 2000; Morsanyi & Handley, 2012) 
introduced ambiguity about what responses were desired by the experimenter. In contrast, the 
passive reading task and online eye movement measures employed in the present study meant 
that counterfactual understanding was tested in real-time under relatively natural constraints, 
while limiting response biases. Interestingly, these comparable anomaly detection responses 
were found despite the ASD group scoring significantly lower than the TD group on the 
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imagination task, and marginally lower on our measure of inhibitory control, and when these 
measures were controlled for in our statistical analyses. These two cognitive skills are 
thought to be highly important for successful counterfactual reasoning. This suggests that 
although the adult ASD sample tested here were compromised on these skills relative to their 
TD peers (see also Adams & Jarrold, 2012; Williams & Jarrold, 2013), they were sufficiently 
able to inhibit reality and imagine an appropriate alternative to interpret the logically valid 
counterfactuals tested here.  
What then do these results mean for theories of ASD that implicate impaired 
contextual integration? The weak central coherence theory links a local processing bias with 
a lack of global coherence in ASD (Frith, 1989; Frith & Happ, 1994; Happ & Frith, 2006), 
which would predict that individuals with ASD would be impaired at integrating information 
within and between sentences (and thus miss anomalies). Another cognitive account, the 
theory of complex information processing (CIP; Minshew, Goldstein, & Siegel, 1997; 
Minshew & Goldstein, 1998; Minshew, Williams, & McFadden, 2008) proposes that ASD is 
the result of an impairment in the ÔcomplexÕ processes that facilitate information integration 
or the use of top-down knowledge. Our results suggest that participants with ASD 
spontaneously maintained global coherence across the entire sentence, showing appropriate 
anomaly detection responses based on discourse in Experiment 1, and based on a 
counterfactual premise that modified reality in Experiment 2. Indeed, the fact that discourse-
based anomalies in Experiment 1 were detected even faster by participants with ASD than 
TD participants, suggests superior integration skills. These results are consistent with the 
findings from Au-Yeung, Kaakinen, Liversedge, and BensonÕs (2015) eye-tracking reading 
study, where participants with ASD showed no difficulty utilizing the global discourse 
context to interpret a sentence as ironic (or not). However, it is important to note that the 
distinction between local/global and simple/complex contexts is currently undefined in the 
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WCC and CIP theories, making it possible that adults with ASD are able to maintain global 
coherence within a single sentence. Further studies are needed to test how people with ASD 
interpret counterfactual events when the counterfactual world needs to be maintained over 
time (i.e. over multiple clauses and sentences), or when the discourse switches between 
factual and counterfactual versions of the world (as in Ferguson & Cane, 2015). 
 In conclusion, the two experiments reported here suggest that counterfactual 
understanding is undiminished in adults with ASD. Participants with ASD rapidly 
accommodated the hypothetical counterfactual world, and successfully detected contextually 
inconsistent events within factual and counterfactual contexts, in a comparable timecourse to 
TD participants. In fact, participants with ASD were faster than TD participants to detect 
anomalies within realistic, discourse-based counterfactuals, and detection was comparable 
when understanding could be grounded in knowledge about reality. Both groups experienced 
interference from the the alternative ÔworldÕ when overlap between worlds was high (as in 
Experiment 1), but not when the two worlds were more clearly distinct (as in Experiment 2). 
These data demonstrate that people with ASD employ subtly different processing strategies 
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Figure 1. a) Regression Path Time for Region 3, Experiment 1, for ASD and TD participants 
in consistent and inconsistent conditions. b) Total Reading Time (ms) for Region 4, 





Figure 2. First pass reading times on Region 3, Experiment 2, for ASD and TD participants 
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Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent
Pre-critical region
First-pass reading time (ms) 831 (514) 898 (610) 703 (417) 821 (664) 941 (573) 948 (606) 798 (520) 841 (568)
Regression path reading time (ms) 1009 (813) 1098 (920) 815 (547) 868 (671) 1003 (635) 1077 (698) 867 (549) 929 (619)
Total reading time (ms) 1350 (1011) 1559 (1178) 1051 (651) 1319 (1102) 1304 (935) 1571 (1193) 1056 (708) 1313 (1015)
Critical region
First-pass reading time (ms) 243 (109) 248 (116) 226 (89) 260 (187) 251 (104) 241 (99) 246 (120) 237 (94)
Regression path reading time (ms) 579 (915) 625 (807) 450 (525) 579 (711) 494 (810) 471 (839) 358 (268) 384 (332)
Total reading time (ms) 357 (253) 423 (363) 350 (234) 455 (351) 327 (195) 345 (237) 301 (164) 367 (273)
Post-critical region
First-pass reading time (ms) 396 (256) 390 (258) 366 (244) 420 (281) 429 (279) 399 (282) 418 (267) 452 (283)
Regression path reading time (ms) 1444 (1323) 1963 (1909) 1354 (1308) 2054 (2009) 1404 (1655) 1925 (2225) 1076 (1166) 1774 (1804)
Total reading time (ms) 558 (428) 616 (504) 556 (416) 688 (421) 557 (385) 578 (420) 509 (336) 647 (441)
ASD TD
Counterfactual Factual Counterfactual Factual
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Table 3. Model Estimate, Standard Error (SE) and t-value for first pass reading time, regression path and total reading time in each region for Experiment 1 
(Ôp < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001).		
	
Est. SE t Est. SE t Est. SE t
Pre-critical region
Context -0.078 0.013  -6.05 *** -0.088 0.009  -9.31 *** -0.084 0.010  -8.07 ***
Consistency -0.013 0.011 -1.11 -0.016 0.009 -1.68 -0.065 0.011  -6.16 ***
Group 0.035 0.039 0.91 0.011 0.037 0.30 -0.011 0.044 -0.25
Imagination 0.003 0.002 1.42 0.005 0.002 2.36 * 0.005 0.003 1.94 '
Inhibitory Control 0.000 0.000 0.42 0.000 0.000 1.15 0.000 0.000 1.31
Context:Consistency -0.013 0.020 -0.65 0.019 0.018 1.07 0.012 0.019 0.65
Context:Group -0.003 0.020 -0.14 0.023 0.018 1.32 0.004 0.019 0.21
Consistency:Group 0.023 0.020 1.13 -0.005 0.018 -0.29 -0.016 0.019 -0.81
Context:Consistency:Group 0.019 0.039 0.48 -0.013 0.035 -0.37 0.004 0.037 0.10
Critical region
Context -0.011 0.010 -1.11 -0.020 0.021 -0.98 0.004 0.016 0.25
Consistency -0.003 0.012 -0.26 -0.025 0.019 -1.29 -0.052 0.019  -2.78 **
Group -0.008 0.020 -0.39 -0.113 0.047  -2.42 * -0.061 0.032  -1.90 '
Imagination 0.003 0.001 2.54 * 0.007 0.003 2.7 * 0.003 0.002 1.66
Inhibitory Control 0.000 0.000 1.10 0.001 0.000 1.48 0.000 0.000 1.14
Context:Consistency -0.020 0.020 -0.99 -0.031 0.033 -0.94 -0.039 0.026 -1.49
Context:Group -0.004 0.019 -0.19 0.009 0.041 0.23 -0.008 0.028 -0.29
Consistency:Group 0.040 0.020 2.00 * 0.076 0.035 2.18 * 0.039 0.025 1.56
Context:Consistency:Group 0.032 0.041 0.77 -0.018 0.065 -0.28 -0.023 0.052 -0.45
Post-critical region
Context 0.010 0.012 0.82 -0.032 0.020 -1.62 0.019 0.013 1.46
Consistency -0.005 0.013 -0.39 -0.153 0.024  -6.35 *** -0.064 0.016  -4.03 ***
Group 0.011 0.035 0.33 -0.106 0.083 -1.27 -0.037 0.048 -0.77
Imagination 0.001 0.002 0.65 0.006 0.005 1.13 0.003 0.003 0.95
Inhibitory Control 0.000 0.000 -1.16 0.000 0.001 -0.03 0.000 0.000 -0.15
Context:Consistency -0.059 0.024  -2.46 * -0.071 0.036  -1.98 * -0.081 0.025  -3.28 **
Context:Group 0.035 0.024 1.45 -0.019 0.036 -0.53 -0.015 0.025 -0.61
Consistency:Group 0.038 0.024 1.56 -0.010 0.036 -0.28 0.028 0.027 1.02
Context:Consistency:Group 0.014 0.048 0.29 -0.015 0.072 -0.21 0.009 0.049 0.17
Total reading timesFirst-pass reading times Regression path reading time
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Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent
Pre-critical region
First-pass reading time (ms) 607 (394) 566 (353) 505 (292) 545 (360) 646 (330) 652 (346) 550 (293) 573 (351)
Regression path reading time (ms) 701 (459) 721 (588) 575 (352) 622 (433) 707 (346) 731 (441) 612 (339) 649 (392)
Total reading time (ms) 1013 (577) 1154 (860) 805 (548) 855 (567) 928 (502) 1164 (760) 740 (389) 942 (626)
Critical region
First-pass reading time (ms) 247 (114) 241 (127) 252 (116) 266 (125) 218 (76) 248 (109) 250 (102) 261 (117)
Regression path reading time (ms) 414 (494) 483 (538) 490 (602) 490 (513) 408 (424) 454 (510) 398 (384) 481 (600)
Total reading time (ms) 383 (257) 398 (241) 405 (265) 468 (335) 327 (256) 397 (306) 333 (201) 412 (242)
Post-critical region
First-pass reading time (ms) 377 (257) 405 (296) 439 (347) 451 (369) 407 (262) 407 (279) 405 (268) 425 (311)
Regression path reading time (ms) 1561 (1328) 1901 (1627) 1315 (1161) 1526 (1255) 1116 (904) 1796 (1737) 980 (839) 1531 (1482)
Total reading time (ms) 599 (422) 674 (482) 598 (462) 689 (516) 530 (309) 595 (419) 506 (304) 627 (497)
ASD TD
Counterfactual Factual Counterfactual Factual
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Table 5. Model Estimate, Standard Error (SE) and t-value for first pass reading time, regression path and total reading time in each region for Experiment 2 
(Ôp < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001). 
	 	
Est. SE t Est. SE t Est. SE t
Pre-critical region
Context -0.074 0.013  -5.48 *** -0.083 0.012  -7.19 *** -0.131 0.014  -9.49 ***
Consistency -0.001 0.012 -0.10 -0.009 0.011 -0.86 -0.059 0.012  -5.12 ***
Group 0.026 0.038 0.67 0.021 0.037 0.57 -0.015 0.040 -0.37
Imagination 0.004 0.002 1.83 ' 0.004 0.002 1.94 ' 0.005 0.003 2.07 *
Inhibitory Control 0.000 0.000 0.11 0.000 0.000 1.33 0.000 0.000 1.33
Context:Consistency -0.022 0.021 -1.06 -0.012 0.020 -0.61 0.007 0.020 0.33
Context:Group -0.024 0.021 -1.17 -0.001 0.020 -0.08 0.034 0.020 1.66 '
Consistency:Group -0.023 0.023 -1.00 -0.011 0.021 -0.53 -0.052 0.023  -2.24 *
Context:Consistency:Group 0.031 0.041 0.75 -0.003 0.039 -0.09 -0.025 0.041 -0.60
Critical region
Context 0.028 0.012 2.38 * 0.025 0.019 1.32 0.037 0.012 3.08 **
Consistency -0.019 0.011  -1.77 ' -0.043 0.018  -2.38 * -0.061 0.015  -4.08 ***
Group -0.032 0.019  -1.73 ' -0.058 0.041 -1.43 -0.073 0.031  -2.37 *
Imagination 0.004 0.001 3.52 *** 0.007 0.003 2.77 ** 0.004 0.002 2.26 *
Inhibitory Control 0.000 0.000 0.94 0.000 0.000 1.12 0.000 0.000 0.915
Context:Consistency -0.005 0.017 -0.26 -0.008 0.030 -0.25 -0.031 0.024 -1.263
Context:Group 0.012 0.019 0.63 -0.005 0.033 -0.17 -0.007 0.024 -0.294
Consistency:Group -0.022 0.020 -1.10 -0.004 0.034 -0.13 -0.039 0.028 -1.389
Context:Consistency:Group 0.079 0.035 2.27 * 0.006 0.061 0.10 0.029 0.049 0.601
Post-critical region
Context 0.026 0.013 2.01 * -0.064 0.017  -3.73 *** -0.001 0.013 -0.07
Consistency -0.003 0.017 -0.18 -0.127 0.028  -4.61 *** -0.046 0.020  -2.37 *
Group -0.015 0.035 -0.42 -0.119 0.073 -1.64 -0.066 0.048 -1.37
Imagination 0.002 0.002 0.81 0.006 0.005 1.37 0.004 0.003 1.27
Inhibitory Control 0.000 0.000 0.04 0.000 0.001 0.82 0.000 0.000 0.31
Context:Consistency 0.002 0.025 0.08 0.009 0.034 0.28 -0.014 0.025 -0.54
Context:Group -0.020 0.025 -0.80 0.039 0.034 1.15 0.017 0.026 0.64
Consistency:Group 0.013 0.026 0.49 -0.077 0.046 -1.69 -0.006 0.028 -0.20
Context:Consistency:Group 0.008 0.051 0.16 0.035 0.069 0.52 -0.005 0.050 -0.10




Experimental Items, Experiment 1. Note that for each of the items below, conditions are listed 




If Joanne had remembered her umbrella, her hair would have been dry when she arrived 
home. 
If Joanne had remembered her umbrella, her hair would have been wet when she arrived 
home. 
Because Joanne had remembered her umbrella, her hair had been dry when she arrived home. 
Because Joanne had remembered her umbrella, her hair had been wet when she arrived home. 
 
2 
If the racing driver had won the championship, he would have gone to the pub to celebrate 
with his team. 
If the racing driver had won the championship, he would have gone to the pub to 
commiserate with his team. 
Because the racing driver had won the championship, he had gone to the pub to celebrate 
with his team. 
Because the racing driver had won the championship, he had gone to the pub to commiserate 
with his team. 
 
3 
If David had been wearing his glasses, he would have found that the words were clear on the 
poster. 
If David had been wearing his glasses, he would have found that the words were blurry on the 
poster. 
Because David had been wearing his glasses, he had found that the words were clear on the 
poster. 




If Alice had not got stuck in a traffic jam driving home, she would have arrived home on time 
that evening. 
If Alice had not got stuck in a traffic jam driving home, she would have arrived home late 
that evening. 
Because Alice had got stuck in a traffic jam driving home, she had arrived home late that 
evening. 




If Catherine had worn a coat in the rain, her dress would have been dry when she arrived at 
work. 
If Catherine had worn a coat in the rain, her dress would have been soaked when she arrived 
at work. 
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Because Catherine had worn a coat in the rain, her dress had been dry when she arrived at 
work. 




If David had eaten a large lunch, his stomach would have been full that afternoon. 
If David had eaten a large lunch, his stomach would have been empty that afternoon. 
Because David had eaten a large lunch, his stomach had been full that afternoon. 
Because David had eaten a large lunch, his stomach had been empty that afternoon. 
 
7 
If Sylvia had worn thick socks in the snow, her feet would have been warm inside her boots. 
If Sylvia had worn thick socks in the snow, her feet would have been cold inside her boots. 
Because Sylvia had worn  thick socks in the snow, her feet had been warm inside her boots. 
Because Sylvia had worn thick socks in the snow, her feet had been cold inside her boots. 
 
8 
If Hannah had fixed her freezer, when she checked the ice trays the water would have been 
frozen that evening. 
If Hannah had fixed her freezer, when she checked the ice trays the water would have been 
liquid that evening. 
Because Hannah had fixed her freezer, when she checked the ice trays the water had been 
frozen that evening. 
Because Hannah had fixed her freezer, when she checked the ice trays the water had been 
liquid that evening. 
 
9 
If Jacob had felt confident with his looks, whenever he looked in the mirror he would have 
thought he looked good for his age. 
If Jacob had felt confident with his looks, whenever he looked in the mirror he would have 
thought he looked bad for his age. 
Because Jacob had felt confident with his looks, whenever he looked in the mirror, he had 
thought he looked good for his age. 
Because Jacob had felt confident with his looks, whenever he looked in the mirror, he had 
thought he looked bad for his age. 
 
10 
If Fred had seen the looming dark clouds, he would have prepared himself for rain as he got 
dressed. 
If Fred had seen the looming dark clouds, he would have prepared himself for sunshine as he 
got dressed. 
Because Fred had seen the looming dark clouds, he had prepared himself for rain as he got 
dressed. 




If Tim's team had correctly answered the most questions in the pub quiz, they would have 
won the top prize. 
		 45	
If Tim's team had correctly answered the most questions in the pub quiz, they would have lost 
the top prize. 
Because Tim's team had correctly answered the most questions in the pub quiz, they had won 
the top prize. 
Because Tim's team had correctly answered the most questions in the pub quiz, they had lost 
the top prize. 
 
12 
If John's mother had cooked him an enormous roast dinner, he would have felt very full as he 
watched TV. 
If John's mother had cooked him an enormous roast dinner, he would have felt very hungry as 
he watched TV. 
Because John's mother had cooked him an enormous roast dinner, he had felt very full as he 
watched TV. 
Because John's mother had cooked him an enormous roast dinner, he had felt very hungry as 
he watched TV. 
 
13 
If Andy had understood everything in the statistics lecture, he would have found his 
homework very easy to complete correctly. 
If Andy had understood everything in the statistics lecture, he would have found his 
homework very difficult to complete correctly. 
Because Andy had understood everything in the statistics lecture, he had found his homework 
very easy to complete correctly. 
Because Andy had understood everything in the statistics lecture, he had found his homework 
very difficult to complete correctly. 
 
14 
If Jill had not put her ice lolly back in the freezer before she answered the door, it would have 
been melted when she returned to it. 
If Jill had not put her ice lolly back in the freezer before she answered the door, it would have 
been frozen when she returned to it. 
Because Jill had put  her ice lolly back in the freezer before she answered the door, it had 
been frozen when she returned to it. 
Because Jill had put  her ice lolly back in the freezer before she answered the door, it had 
been melted when she returned to it. 
 
15 
If GuyÕs debate team had made a successful argument, the compere would have announced 
them as the winners of the big debate. 
If GuyÕs debate team had made a successful argument, the compere would have announced 
them as the losers of the big debate. 
Because Guy's debate team had made a successful argument, the compere had announced 
them as the winners of the big debate. 
Because Guy's debate team had made a successful argument, the compere had announced 
them as losers of the big debate. 
 
16 
If Liz had stuck to the weight watchers plan, she would have noticed that her clothes were 
feeling loose after two weeks. 
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If Liz had stuck to the weight watchers plan, she would have noticed that her clothes were 
feeling tight after two weeks. 
Because Liz had stuck to the weight watchers plan, she had noticed that her clothes were 
feeling loose after two weeks. 
Because Liz had stuck to the weight watchers plan, she had noticed that her clothes were 
feeling tight after two weeks. 
 
17 
If the central heating system had not broken down, the housemates would have found the 
house was warm in the morning. 
If the central heating system had not broken down, the housemates would have found the 
house was cold in the morning. 
Because the central heating system had broken down, the housemates had found the house 
was cold in the morning. 
Because the central heating system had broken down, the housemates had found the house 
was warm in the morning. 
 
18 
If Lee had worked out at the gym after work and felt tired, he would have decided to go to 
bed early that evening. 
If Lee had worked out at the gym after work and felt tired, he would have decided to go to 
bed late that evening. 
Because Lee had worked out at the gym after work and felt tired, he had decided to go to bed 
early that evening. 
Because Lee had worked out at the gym after work and felt tired, he had decided to go to bed 
late that evening. 
 
19 
If Maria had not lost her case, she would have left the courtroom feeling happy about the 
outcome. 
If Maria had not lost her case, she would have left the courtroom feeling upset about the 
outcome. 
Because Maria had lost her case, she had left the courtroom feeling upset about the outcome. 
Because Maria had lost her case, she had left the courtroom feeling happy about the outcome. 
 
20 
If the comedian had thoroughly prepared his act, his audience would have left feeling happy 
at the end. 
If the comedian had thoroughly prepared his act, his audience would have left feeling 
disappointed at the end. 
Because the comedian had thoroughly prepared his act, his audience had left feeling happy at 
the end. 
Because the comedian had thoroughly prepared his act, his audience had left feeling 
disappointed at the end. 
 
21 
If Alison had not got very drunk at the party, she would have woken up feeling refreshed the 
next day. 
If Alison had not got very drunk at the party, she would have woken up feeling hungover the 
next day. 
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Because Alison had got very drunk at the party, she had woken up feeling hungover the next 
day. 




If Inez' grandchildren had not knocked over the antique vase, it would have been intact when 
her guests arrived. 
If Inez' grandchildren had not knocked over the antique vase, it would have been broken 
when her guests arrived. 
Because Inez' grandchildren had knocked over the antique vase, it had been broken when her 
guests arrived. 




If Charlie and his wife had not been arguing, they would have eaten dinner together happily 
at the table. 
If Charlie and his wife had not been arguing, they would have eaten dinner together in silence 
at the table. 
Because Charlie and his wife had been arguing, they had eaten together in silence at the table. 
Because Charlie and his wife had been arguing, they had eaten together happily at the table. 
 
24 
If Stephen had not done well in his first year at University, he would have been disappointed 
with the results. 
If Stephen had not done well in his first year at University, he would have been happy with 
the results. 
Because Stephen had done well in his first year at University, he had been happy with his 
results. 




If Jessica had not enjoyed science, the day she spent visiting the science museum would have 
felt too long for her. 
If Jessica had not enjoyed science, the day she spent visiting the science museum would have 
felt too short for her. 
Because Jessica enjoyed science, the day she spent visiting the science museum had felt too 
short for her. 
Because Jessica enjoyed science, the day she spent visiting the science museum had felt too 
long for her. 
 
26 
If Elaine's car had not passed its MOT, it would have been deemed dangerous to drive on the 
roads. 
If Elaine's car had not passed its MOT, it would have been deemed safe to drive on the roads. 
Because Elaine's car had passed its MOT, it had been deemed safe to be driven on the roads. 





If John had not hurt his back, when he woke up in the morning, it would have felt fine all 
over. 
If John had not hurt his back, when he woke up in the morning, it would have felt stiff all 
over. 
Because John had hurt his back, when he woke up in the morning, it had felt stiff all over. 
Because John had hurt his back, when he woke up in the morning, it had felt fine all over. 
 
28 
If the earthquake had not caused a radioactive isotope to leak from the nuclear plant, the air 
would have been clean the next day. 
If the earthquake had not caused a radioactive isotope to leak from the nuclear plant, the air 
would have been contaminated the next day. 
Because the earthquake had caused a radioactive isotope to leak from the nuclear plant, the 
air had been contaminated the next day. 
Because the earthquake had caused a radioactive isotope to leak from the nuclear plant, the 
air had been clean the next day. 
 
29 
If Greg had not remembered his asthma inhaler at the football game, his breathing would 
have been erratic at half time. 
If Greg had not remembered his asthma inhaler at the football game, his breathing would 
have been fine at half time. 
Because Greg had remembered his asthma inhaler at the football game, his breathing had 
been fine at half time. 
Because Greg had remembered his asthma inhaler at the football game, his breathing had 
been erratic at half time. 
 
30 
If the gymnast had not warmed up sufficiently and not performed well, her coach would have 
criticised her effort. 
If the gymnast had not warmed up sufficiently and not performed well, her coach would have 
praised her effort. 
Because the gymnast had warmed up sufficiently and performed well, her coach had praised 
her effort. 
Because the gymnast had warmed up sufficiently and performed well, her coach had 
criticised her effort. 
 
31 
If Sally had not had a skiing accident, she would have boarded the flight home with no 
problems after a week. 
If Sally had not had a skiing accident, she would have boarded the flight home with crutches 
after a week. 
Because Sally had had a skiing accident, she had boarded the flight home with crutches after 
a week. 
Because Sally had had a skiing accident, she had boarded the flight home with no problems 




If Jamie had not put sugar in her coffee, she would have tasted that it was bitter and very 
strong. 
If Jamie had not put sugar in her coffee, she would have tasted that it was sweet and very 
strong. 
Because Jamie had put sugar in her coffee, she had tasted that it was sweet and very strong. 
Because Jamie had put sugar in her coffee, she had tasted that it was bitter and very strong. 
 
 
Experimental items, Experiment 2. Note that for each of the items below, conditions are listed 




If Spain were not a member of the European Union, they would pay for things using pesetas 
in shops today. 
If Spain were not a member of the European Union, they would pay for things using Euros in 
shops today. 
Because Spain is a member of the European Union, they pay for things using euros in shops 
today. 




If people did not celebrate Christmas, the 25th December would be a normal day in the UK. 
If people did not celebrate Christmas, the 25th December would be a holiday in the UK. 
Because people celebrate Christmas, the 25th December is a holiday in the UK. 
Because people celebrate Christmas, the 25th December is a normal day in the UK. 
 
3 
If the UK had not won the contest to host the 2012 Olympics Games, they would have taken 
place in Paris that year. 
If the UK had not won the contest to host the 2012 Olympics Games, they would have taken 
place in London that year. 
Because the UK won the contest to host the 2012 Olympic Games, they took place in London 
that year. 




If the internet had not been created, we would tend to write letters to communicate. 
If the internet had not been created, we would tend to write emails to communicate. 
Because the internet was created, we tend to write emails to communicate. 
Because the internet was created, we tend to write letters to communicate. 
 
5 
If Labour had not lost the May 2015 election, the Prime Minister would be Ed Miliband for 
five years. 
If Labour had not lost the May 2015 election, the Prime Minister would be David Cameron 
for five years. 
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Because Labour lost the May 2015 election, the Prime Minister is David Cameron for five 
years. 
Because Labour lost the May 2015 election, the Prime Minister is Ed Miliband for five years. 
 
6 
If electricity had not been discovered, we would light our homes with candles at night. 
If electricity had not been discovered, we would light our homes with lightbulbs at night. 
Because electricity was discovered, we light our homes with lightbulbs at night. 
Because electricity was discovered, we light our homes with candles at night. 
 
7 
If the Titanic had not hit an iceberg, it would have survived along with all the passengers. 
If the Titanic had not hit an iceberg, it would have sunk along with all the passengers. 
Because the Titanic hit an iceberg, it sunk along with all the passengers. 
Because the Titanic hit an iceberg, it survived along with all the passengers. 
 
8 
If Kate Middleton had not married Prince William, today she would be unknown throughout 
the world. 
If Kate Middleton had not married Prince William, today she would be famous throughout 
the world. 
Because Kate Middleton married Prince William, today she is famous throughout the world. 




If tuition fees had not increased in 2012, Bachelor's degrees would cost three thousand 
pounds per year. 
If tuition fees had not increased in 2012, Bachelor's degrees would cost nine thousand pounds 
per year. 
Because tuition fees have increased in 2012, Bachelor's degrees cost nine thousand pounds 
per year. 




If the car driving Princess Diana had not crashed, today she would be alive, along with Dodi. 
If the car driving Princess Diana had not crashed, today she would be dead, along with Dodi. 
Because the car driving Princess Diana did crash, today she is dead, along with Dodi. 
Because the car driving Princess Diana did crash, today she is alive, along with Dodi. 
 
11 
If Coca-Cola had not changed the colour of Santa Claus' suit, it would be green and white. 
If Coca-Cola had not changed the colour of Santa Claus' suit, it would be red and white. 
Because Coca-Cola changed the colour of Santa Claus' suit, it is red and white. 
Because Coca-Cola changed the colour of Santa Claus' suit, it is green and white. 
 
12 
If there weren't any laws against murder, the majority of murderers would be free in this 
country. 
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If there weren't any laws against murder, the majority of murderers would be imprisoned in 
this country. 
Because there are laws against murder, the majority of murderers are imprisoned in this 
country. 
Because there are laws against murder, the majority of murderers are free in this country. 
 
13 
If mobile phones weren't invented, meeting up with people would be harder when out and 
about. 
If mobile phones weren't invented, meeting up with people would be easier when out and 
about. 
Because mobile phones were invented, meeting up with people is easier when out and about. 
Because mobile phones were invented, meeting up with people is harder when out and about. 
 
14 
If IKEA furniture did not have instructions, assembling it would be difficult for most people. 
If IKEA furniture did not have instructions, assembling it would be easy for most people. 
Because IKEA furniture comes with instructions, assembling it is easy for most people. 
Because IKEA furniture comes with instructions, assembling it is difficult for most people. 
 
15 
If we did not have the NHS, prescription medication would be relatively expensive in most 
cases. 
If we did not have the NHS, prescription medication would be relatively cheap in most cases. 
Because we have the NHS, prescription medication is relatively cheap in most cases. 
Because we have the NHS, prescription medication is relatively expensive in most cases. 
 
16 
If we did not have washing machines, we would wash our clothes by hand in our homes. 
If we did not have washing machines, we would wash our clothes by machine in our homes. 
Because we have washing machines, we wash our clothes by machine in our homes. 
Because we have washing machines, we wash our clothes by hand in our homes. 
 
17 
If waste produced from nuclear energy did not emit radiation, it would be safe for us. 
If waste produced from nuclear energy did not emit radiation, it would be dangerous for us. 
Because waste produced from nuclear energy emits radiation, it is dangerous for us. 
Because waste produced from nuclear energy emits radiation, it is safe for us. 
 
18 
If cars had not been invented, we would get to places a lot slower in most cases. 
If cars had not been invented, we would get to places a lot faster in most cases. 
Because cars were invented, we get to places a lot faster in most cases. 
Because cars were invented, we get to places a lot slower in most cases. 
 
19 
If the mp3 format had not been invented, CD sales would be higher in retail outlets. 
If the mp3 format had not been invented, CD sales would be lower in retail outlets. 
Because the mp3 format was invented, CD sales are lower in retail outlets. 




If there wasn't a limit to how much alcohol you could drink before driving, travelling on the 
roads would be riskier on average. 
If there wasn't a limit to how much alcohol you could drink before driving, travelling on the 
roads would be safer on average. 
Because there is a limit to how much alcohol you can drink before driving, travelling on the 
roads is safer on average. 
Because there is a limit to how much alcohol you can drink before driving, travelling on the 
roads is riskier on average. 
 
21 
If glasses had not been invented, many people would have vision that is worse as a result. 
If glasses had not been invented, many people would have vision that is better as a result. 
Because glasses were invented, many people have vision that is better as a result. 
Because glasses were invented, many people have vision that is worse as a result. 
 
22 
If there were no anti-smoking laws, smoking would be permitted in most workplaces. 
If there were no anti-smoking laws, smoking would be forbidden in most workplaces. 
Because there are anti-smoking laws, smoking is forbidden in most workplaces. 
Because there are anti-smoking laws, smoking is permitted in most workplaces. 
 
23 
If dogs had never been tamed, they would be considered wild nowadays. 
If dogs had never been tamed, they would be considered domesticated nowadays. 
Because dogs have been tamed, they are considered domesticated nowadays. 
Because dogs have been tamed, they are considered wild nowadays. 
 
24 
If the Channel Tunnel had not been built, the journey between London and Paris would be 
longer for travellers. 
If the Channel Tunnel had not been built, the journey between London and Paris would be 
shorter for travellers. 
Because the Channel Tunnel was built, the journey between London and Paris is shorter for 
travellers. 




If the Berlin wall had not been pulled down, Germany would be a divided country in Europe. 
If the Berlin wall had not been pulled down, Germany would be a united country in Europe. 
Because the Berlin wall was pulled down, Germany is a united country in Europe. 
Because the Berlin wall was pulled down, Germany is a divided country in Europe. 
 
26 
If AL 'Qaeda had not carried out the attacks on September 11th, the twin towers would be 
standing in New York City. 
If AL 'Qaeda had not carried out the attacks on September 11th, the twin towers would be 
destroyed in New York City. 
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Because Al 'Qaeda carried out the attacks on September 11th, the twin towers are destroyed 
in New York City. 
Because Al 'Qaeda carried out the attacks on September 11th, the twin towers are standing in 
New York City. 
 
27 
If it weren't forbidden for Muslims to drink alcohol, they would be able to drink wine among 
other things. 
If it weren't forbidden for Muslims to drink alcohol, they would be able to drink water among 
other things. 
Because it is forbidden for Muslims to drink alcohol, they can drink water among other 
things. 
Because it is forbidden for Muslims to drink alcohol, they can drink wine among other things. 
 
28 
If the financial crisis had not affected the UK, there would be a lot of money across the 
country. 
If the financial crisis had not affected the UK, there would be a lot of poverty across the 
country. 
Because the financial crisis affected the UK, there is a lot of poverty across the country. 
Because the financial crisis affected the UK, there is a lot of money across the country. 
 
29 
If we had not discovered fire, we would eat our food when it is raw most of the time. 
If we have not discovered fire, we would eat our food when it is cooked most of the time. 
Because we discovered fire, we eat our food when it is cooked most of the time. 
Because we discovered fire, we eat our food when it is raw most of the time. 
 
30 
If broadband had not been invented, internet connections would be much slower these days. 
If broadband had not been invented, internet connections would be much faster these days. 
Because broadband was invented, internet connections are much faster these days. 
Because broadband was invented, internet connections are much slower these days. 
 
31 
If Susan Boyle hadn't taken part in Britain's Got Talent, today she would be working as a 
cashier to earn money. 
If Susan Boyle hadn't taken part in Britain's Got Talent, today she would be working as a 
singer to earn money. 
Because Susan Boyle took part in Britain's Got Talent, today she is working as a singer to 
earn money. 




If Bill Gates had not created Microsoft, his fortune would be less than the average person. 
If Bill Gates had not created Microsoft, his fortune would be more than the average person. 
Because Bill Gates created Microsoft, his fortune is more than the average person. 
Because Bill Gates created Microsoft, his fortune is less than the average person. 
 
